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Abstract. For dependability outages in distributed internet infrastructures, it is often not enough to detect a 
failure, but it is also required to diagnose it, i.e., to identify its source. Complex applications deployed in 
multi-tier environments, such as the classic three tier e-commerce system, make diagnosis challenging 
because of fast error propagation, black-box applications, constraints on the diagnosis delay, the amount of 
states that can be maintained, and imperfect diagnostic tests. Here, we propose a probabilistic diagnosis model 
for arbitrary failures in components of a distributed application. The monitoring system (the Monitor) 
passively observes the message exchanges between the components and at runtime, performs a probabilistic 
diagnosis of the component that was the root cause of a detected failure. The diagnosis model takes into 
account the possibility of a service failure, link failure, test imperfection, and lack of perfect observability at 
the monitoring station. We demonstrate the approach by applying it to a J2EE-based e-commerce application 
called Pet Store exercising a workload of browse-and-buy user transactions. We compare our approach with 
Pinpoint by quantifying the latency and accuracy of the two systems. The Monitor system outperforms 
Pinpoint by achieving comparably accurate diagnosis with higher precision in shorter time. 
Keywords. Distributed system diagnosis, runtime monitoring, probabilistic diagnosis, fault injection based 
evaluation, J2EE e-commerce system. 
I. Introduction 
The connected society of today has come to rely heavily on distributed computer infrastructure, be 
it an ATM network, or the distributed multi-tier applications behind e-commerce sites. The 
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consequences of downtime of distributed systems may be catastrophic. They range from customer 
dissatisfaction to financial losses to loss of human lives [40], [41]. There is an increased reliance on 
Internet services supported by multi-tier applications where the typical three tiers are the web, 
middleware and database tier. In distributed systems, especially multi-tier applications, the fault in a 
component may manifest itself as an error, and then propagate to multiple services through the 
normal communication between the services. The error may remain undetected for an arbitrary 
length of time causing long error propagation chains. The error can propagate from one component 
to another and finally manifest itself as a failure. The failure might be detected at a component 
distant from the originally faulty component. The availability of a system can be quantified as 
MTTF/(MTTF+MTTR) (MTTF: Mean time to failure, MTTR: Mean time to recovery). There is 
enormous effort in the fault tolerance community to increase the reliability of components in a 
distributed system, thus increasing MTTF. There is also a growing number of efforts aimed at 
reducing MTTR [34]. An important requirement for this is to know which components to recover. 
This requires tracing back through the chain of errors to determine the component that originated 
the failure. This serves as the goal for our diagnosis protocol.  
For the application and diagnosis model, consider that the application is comprised of multiple 
services communicating through standard protocols and externally observable messages. Example 
of such application services are web services and authentication services. The services themselves 
are comprised of multiple components, e.g. Enterprise Java Beans (EJBs) or servlets, and the 
interactions between these components are also externally visible. Separate from the application 
system, we have a monitoring system (the Monitor) that can observe the external interactions of the 
components but not their internal states. The Monitor initiates diagnosis when a failure is detected 
through an existing detection system. In this paper we use the existing detection system from our 
previous work [1].  
In practical deployments, the Monitor may not observe the interaction between components of the 
application perfectly because of congestion or their relative network placement. This is particularly 
 3 
likely because the application as well as the Monitor is distributed with components spread out 
among possibly distant hosts. Next, any Monitor will have limited resources and may drop some 
message interactions from consideration due to exhaustion of its resources (e.g., buffers) during 
periods of peak load. Third, any diagnostic tests used by the Monitor might not be perfect. Finally, 
several parameters of the environment are not known deterministically and have to be estimated at 
runtime. These include the ability of a component to stop the cascade of error propagation (error 
masking ability) and the unreliability of links between the application components and the Monitor.  
All these factors necessitate the design of a probabilistic diagnosis protocol, in which the root cause 
of the failure cannot be deterministically identified. 
Our solution implemented in the Monitor rests on three basic techniques. First, the messages 
between the components are used to build a causal dependency structure between the components. 
Second, when a failure is detected, the causal structure is traversed (till a well-defined bound) and 
each component is tested using diagnostic tests. These diagnostic tests are not executed on the 
components directly but on the component state that had been deduced and stored at the Monitor. 
We decide against direct tests on the components because the state of the component may have 
changed since the time it propagated the error and the probing introduces additional stress on the 
component at a time when failures are already occurring in the system. Third, runtime observations 
are used to continually estimate the parameters that bear on the possibility of error propagation, 
such as unreliability of links and error masking capabilities. In our approach, the end goal of the 
probabilistic diagnosis process is to produce a vector of values called the Path Probability of Error 
Propagation (PPEP). For the diagnosis executed due to a failure detected at component n, PPEP of 
a component i is the conditional probability that component i is the faulty component that originated 
the cascaded chain of errors culminating in n. 
The basic structuring of an observer and an observed system is not new [1], [2], [3]. The problem 
of diagnosis of failures in networked environments comprised of black-box entities has also been 
studied by numerous researchers [28], [29], [35]. Some of these efforts however are aimed at easing 
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the task of distributed debugging rather than accurate diagnosis of the faulty entity, some are offline 
approaches, some require accurate prior dependency information between the entities, and yet 
others need help from the application system through event generation. Our work aims to provide 
diagnosis of the faulty entities at runtime in a non-intrusive manner to the application.  
We apply the diagnosis protocol to a three tier e-commerce system consisting of the Pet Store 
application deployed on the JBoss application server with the Tomcat web server as the front end 
and the MySQL database server at the backend. The application supports multiple kinds of browse-
and-buy transactions that involve interactions between many components, where components are 
defined as servlets and EJBs. Through a modification to the JBoss containers, messages between the 
components are trapped and forwarded to the Monitor. We compare our approach to Pinpoint [29] 
in terms of accuracy and precision of diagnosis. Pinpoint uses statistical clustering of components 
with failed transactions to identify the faulty components. We inject errors in the application, where 
the errors may be due to a single component or interactions between multiple components. Our 
approach outperforms Pinpoint with the accuracy of the diagnosis improving from 20% to 100% 
over the Pinpoint algorithm for comparable precision values.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II, presents the system model. Section III 
presents the probabilistic diagnosis approach. Section IV presents the implementation and 
experimental test bed. Section V presents the experimental results. Section VI reviews related work 
and Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. System Model and Background 
There are two distinct systems—the Monitor and the application system. The Monitor obtains the 
protocol messages either through modification to the application’s middleware layer to forward the 
messages or by a passive snooping mechanism by the Monitor. In either scenario the internal state 
of the components is not visible to the Monitor and they are treated as black-box for the diagnostic 
process. The diagnostic process is triggered when a failure is detected.  
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A. Assumptions 
We assume that components can fail arbitrarily, as long as the failures are observable in the 
message interaction between components. These failures could be caused by incorrect deployment, 
software bug, security vulnerability or performance problems to name a few. We follow the 
classical definition of faults being underlying defects that are triggered to become errors and some 
errors causing end-user visible failures. Errors can propagate from one component to another 




Interaction among service components
Monitoring interaction among service components
 
Figure 1. A monitoring system, (the Monitor) verifying the interactions between the service 
components.  
 
The communication between the components can be asynchronous but the jitter on any given link 
between component and the Monitor is bounded. We assume that the Monitor maintains a logical 
clock for each observed component and it is incremented for each event – a send or receive message. 
The assumption required by the diagnosis protocol is that for an S(ender)-R(eceiver) 
communication, the variation in the latency on the S-M(onitor) channel as well as the variation in 
the sum of the latency in the S-R and R-M channels is less than a constant ∆t, called the phase. If 
messages M1 and M2, corresponding to two send events at S, are received at the Monitor at (logical) 
times t1 and t2, it is guaranteed that the send event M1 happened before M2 if t2 ≥ t1+∆t. The 
communication channel is considered to be unreliable where message duplication, loss or 
conversion to another correct protocol message may happen. 
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B. Dependency Information 
The Monitor performing diagnosis maintains a causal graph during the times that it is verifying the 
operation of the application protocol. Let us denote the causal graph at Monitor m by CGm which is 
a graph (V, E) where (i) The set V contains all the components verified by m; (ii) An edge or link e 
contained in E, between vertices v1 and v2 (which represent components) indicates interaction 
between v1 and v2 and contains state information about all observed message exchanges between v1 
and v2 including the logical clock (LC) at each end. The state information includes a type of 
interaction and any arguments associated with that interaction. The links in the CG are also time-
stamped with the local (physical) time at the Monitor where the link is created. An example of a CG 
created at the Monitor is given in Figure 2 for the sequence of message exchange events shown with 
components A, B, C, and D. The number denotes the sequence of the messages. For example, for 
message ‘6’, the logical clock time at the sender is B.LC4. Since message ‘2’ is assigned a logical 
time value of B.LC2, it causally precedes message ‘6’. The LC time stamps helps obtain a partial 
order over the messages and hence causality. The order of the messages is the order seen by the 
Monitor which may be different from the order in the application because the communication links 
are asynchronous.  
For a link to be completed in the CG, a matching is required between the sending and the 
receiving component’s messages. The link A→B will be matched once both the message sent by A 
and the corresponding message received by B are seen at the Monitor. The Monitor initially stores 
the messages in a Temporary Links table and moves the matched links to the CG when some trigger 
is met. As many links as can be matched are transferred to the CG while those that are not matched, 
but are within the phase from the latest message, are kept in the temporary links. Remaining links in 
the temporary links table are moved to the CG as unmatched links.  
It is imperative to avoid the CG growing in an unbounded manner since this would lead to long 
delays in traversing the CG during diagnosis leading to high latency in diagnosis. However, 
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complete purging of the information in the CG can cause inaccuracies during the diagnosis process. 
We use aggregation of the state information in the CG at specified time points and storing it in an 
Aggregate Graph (AG). The Aggregate Graph contains aggregate information about the protocol 
behavior averaged over the past. The AG is similar to CG in the structure i.e. a node represents a 
component and a link represents a communication channel. Unlike the CG there is a single directed 
link between A and B for all the messages which are sent from A to B. The AG contains some node 
level information (such as, the node reliability) and some link level information (such as, the 
reliability of the link in the application system).  
C. Diagnosis Tree 
When a failure occurs, a Diagnosis Tree (DT) is constructed using the state information stored in 
CG. The DT formed for failure F at node D is denoted as DTFD.  The tree is rooted at node D and the 
nodes which have directly sent messages to node D are present at depth 1. Recursively, depth i 
consists of all the components which have sent messages to nodes at depth (i-1). Since the CG is 
finite size, the tree is terminated when no causally preceding message is available in the CG after 
some depth k. The same component might appear several times in the tree at various depths because 
it might have exchanged messages with various components at different points during the 
application run.  Specifically, a component is represented as many number of times as the number 
of different states it has been in, while exchanging messages.  
D. Diagnostic Tests 
We assume the existence of diagnostic tests which operate on a component and are specific to that 
component and its state. We impose that the tests should only operate on the information already 
stored at the Monitor. These tests could be probabilistic in nature, implying that they may not be 
perfect. The specifics of these tests do not affect our probabilistic model. However, for our 
implementation, we employ a kind of tests called causal tests. A causal test has the following 
format:  
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<Type> <State1> <Event1> <Count1> <State2> <Event2> <Count2> 
where, Type could be one of {incoming, outgoing, hybrid} depending on the kind of messages 
being tested. The (State1, Event1, Count1) forms the precondition to be matched, while (State2, 
Event2, Count2) forms the post-condition that should be satisfied for the node to be deemed correct. 
The examination of Event 2 is done in an interval of time ∆t (a phase) from Event 1. The tuple (S, E, 
C) refers to the fact that the event E should have been detected in the state S at least count C 














A sample causal graph. A, B, C and D exchange messages 
1-8 among each other. The message ID indicates the 
causal order, i.e., message 1 precedes the rest of messages 
 
 
Figure 3.  
Sample DT for the CG in Fig. 2. 
The correctness rules can be created by examining the state transition diagram (STD) of the 
component and verifying the transitions or by observing some traces of the correct protocol 
operation. Additionally, rules corresponding to QoS requirements (such as, the number of accesses 
to the SignOnEJB in Pet Store must be restricted to 20 within a 1 sec time window) can be framed 
by the system administrators. Finally, rules for verifying security properties in the system (such as, 
the number of logins to Pet Store bounded by a threshold) can be set by security administrators. 
Rules therefore can be framed through a mix of automated and manual means. This is similar to the 
situation in all rule based systems, such as intrusion detection systems [4], [5]. 
III. Probabilistic Diagnosis 
The operation of the diagnosis protocol has two logical phases: (1) The diagnostic process that 
results in a set of nodes being diagnosed as the root cause of failure; (2) Information from the 
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diagnostic process being used to update the parameters used later diagnoses. The overall process is 
depicted in Figure 4. Let us first look at the diagnostic process. The goal of the diagnostic process is 
to calculate the probability of each node in the distributed system being faulty.  
A. Path Probability of Error Propagation 
The DT forms the basic structure on which the algorithm operates. The path P from any node ni to 
the root of the DT constitutes a possible path for error propagation, i.e. a fault present in ni could 
have caused the root node to fail during operation. The probability of a path being the chain of error 
propagation is termed as the Path Probability of Error Propagation (PPEP). 
  A sample DT created from the sample CG in Figure 2 is shown in Figure 3. Here the failure was 
manifested at node D. The numbers at the links correspond to the message IDs. The root of the tree 
is the failure node, i.e., D. Depth 1 consists of nodes C and B which have sent messages to D 
causally before the failure was detected. Here node B is repeated twice because the states of B in 
which B→C and B→D communication take place are different.    
Definition: PPEP(N, D) is defined as the probability of node N being faulty and causing this error 
to propagate on the path from N to D, leading to a failure at D. PPEP depends on the following 
parameters: 
(1) Node reliability – The node reliability (nr) is a quantitative measure of the component 
corresponding to the node being correct. The PPEP for a given node is proportional to (1- nr). This 
node reliability is obtained by running the diagnostic tests on the state of the entity. A set of 
predetermined tests are performed, each of which yields a ‘0’ (test flags an error) or a ‘1’ (success). 
If the entire set of tests is denoted by R and a subset of tests which yield ‘1’ be denoted by R′, we 
define coverage c(n) =  |R′ |/|R|, assuming all tests have equal weights. For the first time the 
diagnosis is triggered, the node reliability is equal to c(n). During the entire execution of the 
application, multiple failures cause multiple diagnosis procedures to execute. Each time the 
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diagnosis is performed, node reliabilities (in AG) corresponding to all of the nodes in the DT are 
updated. We will explain in Section B how to update the node reliabilities. 
 
Figure 4. Schematic with the overall process flow of the diagnostic process 
 
(2) Link Reliability – In simple terms the link realibility between two nodes ni and nj denoted 
as ),( jirl and measures the number of received packets by the receiver over the number of packets 
actually sent. The PPEP for a given node is proportional to the link reliability, because high link 
reliability increases the probability of the path being used for propagating the error. The link 
reliability is maintained for each edge in the AG. Note that since the Monitor is only observing the 
system, the errors within the Monitor in observing the messages also may erroneously affect the 
link reliability. These errors cannot be distinguished in our framework. Monitor deduces the link 
reliability through observing the fraction of successful message transmissions over a particular link. 
(3) Error masking capability (EMC) – The error masking capability (em) quantifies the ability of 
a node to mask an error and not propagate it to the subsequent link on the path in the DT toward the 
root. The EMC of an entity depends on the type of error, e.g., syntactical or semantic errors. 
Additionally, a node may have different error masking capabilities depending on the type of 
message being processed and forwarded, e.g., if there is an off-by-one bug in the counter check on 
the number of simultaneous JDBC connections, it will mask the errors when the number of JDBC 
connections is one more than the maximum threshold. The EMC of node C in Figure 3 is denoted 
by em(C) and is a function of message type and error type. The PPEP for a given node is inversely 
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proportional to the EMC values of nodes in the path since the intermediate nodes are less likely to 
have propagated the error to the root node.  
With the DT in Figure 3, PPEP(C, D) = (1-nr(C)) · lr(C,D),  PPEP(B, D) = (1-nr(B)) · lr(B,C) 
· (1- em(C)) · lr(C,D).  For a general path P consisting of nodes n1, n2…nk with link lr(i, j) between 
nodes ni and nj, the PPEP(n1, nk) for a failure detected at node nk (root node in the corresponding 
DT) is given by 
PPEP(n1, nk) = (1-nr(n1))·lr(1,2)·(1- em(n2))·lr(2,3)… (1-nr(ni))·lr(i,i+1)·(1- em(ni+1))·lr(i+1,i+2)… (1- em(nk-1))·lr(k-1,k). 
Consider a far simpler alternative that may at first glance seem sufficient for the problem of 
diagnosis. The system simply looks at all messages in the system at runtime and checks them using 
the causal tests. The Monitor could detect the error very quickly after the earliest message that 
failed a test. However, this scheme would be incorrect. First, the system cannot check the messages 
as they come in. The rules are specified in terms of logical time and not absolute time (a corollary 
of the asynchronous nature of the system). Additionally, all rules cannot be matched at runtime 
because that would impose unnecessary overhead and would not be useful in most executions 
(when there is no failure). The first component that failed a test does not necessarily implicate the 
component that sent it, other factors are to be considered, such as, how reliable were the links 
between that component and the component at which the failure was ultimately detected. This is 
because the distance from the root is not a matter simply of the number of links on the DT. Also, the 
tests are not perfect and cannot therefore be trusted to indict a component by itself. 
  For an autonomous system, the parameters used in the diagnosis process should be automatically 
updated during the lifetime of the system as more failures and message interactions are observed 
and this forms the topic of our discussion next. 
B. Updating Node reliability 
 
The node reliabilities are updated based on the results of the diagnostic tests. Let the set of tests that 
can be applied to the node i (based on the event and the state) be Ti. This set is partitioned into two 
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sub-sets A′ and A respectively depending upon the test outcome, i.e., the test returned a value of ‘1’ 











The weight of a test is proportional to (1) the frequency of invocations (w(f)) where the test gave 
the correct result; and (2) whether the test examines state for a period of time greater than the length 
of transients in the system (w(r)). The overall weight is calculated as 




i j i j i jw w w=
. 
The first factor is quite self-explanatory—higher the number of times the test has been seen to 
operate correctly, the higher is the confidence placed on it. The second factor argues that violation 
of a tested property for less than the transient period in the system is not indicative of a fault. The 
value c(i) is the current coverage of the node and does not consider the past history of node present 
in AG. The final node reliability is updated using exponential weighting as nr(A) = (1- ρ)c(i) + 
ρnr(A). The value nr(A) is maintained in the AG. The weight can be adjusted depending upon the 
particular scenario.  
C. Updating Link Reliability 
 
Link reliability of the edge from A to B is calculated as lr(A,B) = nm/ nt + nm, where nm is the number 
of matched edges for A-to-B communication and nt is the number of unmatched edges from A to B.  
This formulation is based on the observation that if the sender notifies the Monitor of a sent 
message and the receiver does not report the corresponding packet, this is indication of a lossy link. 
Overall lr(A,B) is updated with the link reliability for the current round (lr(c)) using exponential 
weighting as lr(A,B) = (1- ρ)lr(c) + ρlr(A,B). Notice that in the PPEP calculation, the link reliabilities 
of adjoining links are multiplied though the events are actually not independent. Consider a linear 
chain of communication from A to B and B to C. The probability of a successful communication 
from A to C is P(A→B is successful)·P(B→C is successful | A→B is successful). In the link 
reliability calculation, the dependence is implicitly taken into account since the matched and 
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unmatched link count on the B→C link is affected by the events on the A→B link and the 
measurement of the matched and unmatched links is used in the link reliability computation.  
D. Updating Error Masking Capability 
 
Consider in the DT of Figure 3, nodes C and A at the same depth 2, are both faulty but PPEP(C) is 
the highest and PPEP(A) is low. This will cause node C to be diagnosed as faulty. In this case node 
B is taken to have masked the error originating from node A and not propagated it if the following 
three conditions are satisfied: (i) Running diagnostic tests on B yields a high coverage; (ii) Running 
diagnostic tests on A yields a low coverage; and (iii) Link reliabilities lr(A,B) and lr(B,D) are high 
(to ensure that the error must have propagated).   
The incremental change ∆(EMC) is thus given by 









EMCnew = EMCold+∆(EMC) 
 
We decrease the EMC for every intermediate node residing on a path which is finally diagnosed to 
have caused the error propagation.  
E. Distributed PPEP 
 
The nodes in the Diagnosis Tree may be present in several networks and even organizational 
boundaries and be verified by different Monitors each of which constructs a part of the AG and the 
CG obtained from its local information. During diagnosis it is quite likely that the DT contains 
nodes which are verified by some other Local Monitors. We leverage the fact that due to the 
multiplicative form of the PPEP computation, the PPEP value can be computed incrementally by 
each Monitor for the part of the DT under its verification domain. Each Local Monitor runs the 
diagnosis algorithm to obtain the PPEP values for the nodes under its verification domain. This 
information is aggregated at a higher level Monitor (such as an Intermediate Monitor) to determine 
the faulty entity.  
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IV. Experimental Testbed 
A. Application 
 
We use for our evaluation PetStore (version 1.4), a sample J2EE application developed under the 
Java BluePrints program at Sun Microsystems [37]. It runs on top of the JBoss application server 
[38] with MySQL database [39] as the back-end providing an example of a 3-tier environment. 
Figure 5 depicts the application topology for the experiments. The PetStore application is driven by 
a web client emulator which generates client transactions based on sample traces. The web client 
emulator is written in Perl using lynx as the web browser. For the mix of client transactions, we 
mimic the TPC-WIPSo [36] distribution with equal percentage of browse and buy interactions. The 
servlets and the EJBs are considered as components in our experiments and these serve as the 
granularity level at which diagnosis is done. This design choice is based partly on the fact that in 
JBoss a faulty servlet or an EJB can be switched out at runtime for a correct one. We identify a total 
of 56 components in the application. 
  We consider a web interaction to be a complete cycle of communication between the client 
emulator and the application, as it is defined by the TPC Benchmark WIPSo specification [36]. This 
cycle starts when the client emulator initiates a web request and it is completed when the last byte 
of data from the response page has been received by the client emulator. Examples of web 
interactions could be entering the Welcome page or executing a Search. A transaction is a sequence 
of web interactions. An example of a transaction by a user who is searching and viewing 
information about a particular product is: Welcome page  Search  View Item details. For our 
experiments we created a total of 55 different transactions. A round is a permutation of these 55 
transactions modeling different user activities that occur on the web store. Within a round, 
transactions are executed one at a time. Two transactions are considered to be non-unique if they 
use exactly the same components, neglecting the order in which the components are used. Thus, a 
transaction that comprises: Welcome, Search, Search is not unique with respect to another that 
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comprises: Welcome, Search. There are 41 unique transactions in the set of 55 transactions that we 
use. Although 55 is not an exhaustive set of possible transactions in the application, the chosen set 
exercised a wide variety of web-interactions and between them, touched all the components of 
PetStore. We note that the results presented here depend on the exact set of transactions used to 
exercise the system.  
  We instrumented the JBoss application server to snoop over the message communication between 
PetStore components. JBoss has a layered architecture and each communication traverses multiple 
interceptors. We modify the SecurityInterceptor to forward messages to the Monitor for updating 
the causal graph. Thus, the PetStore application is left unchanged.  
B. Monitor configuration 
 
The diagnosis algorithm in the Monitor is implemented in Java. The Monitor is provided an input of 
state transition diagrams for the verified components and causal tests used during calculation of 
PPEP values. The size of the causal graph is bounded at 100 links. 
  Figure 6 shows an example STD for CreditCardEJB used by the Monitor in our experiments. A 
start state S0 signifies a no request state. If a request for processing is received from another 
component, the state of the EJB moves from S0 accordingly. With the STD, we have some simple 
causal tests which can be derived from the STD itself. As explained in section II.D, causal tests are 
dependent on the state and event of the component. For example, if the EJB is requested for 
getData() then in state S1 there must be a return from getData() to ensure correct operation of the 
EJB. This is verified using the first rule in Figure 6.  The exhaustive list of STDs and rules used for 





















 S0 getData 1 S2 return getData1 1 
S0 getExpiryMonth 1 S1 return getExpiryMonth1 1 
S0 getExpiryData 1 S3 return getExpiryData 1 1 
S0 cardType 1 S4 return cardType1 1 
 
Figure 6. An example STD for CreditCardEJB along with some illustration of Causal Tests. 
 
C. Pinpoint Implementation  
Pinpoint serves as a valid point of comparison with the Monitor since both systems have the same 
focused goal (diagnosis, as opposed to say performance debugging as in [28] with diagnosis being a 
side issue) and have the same target application model (black-box or gray-box application and 
passive observation of the application for diagnosis). Importantly, Pinpoint represents a recent state-
of-the-art development ([29], [35]) and has been well explained and demonstrated on an open 
source application (compare to Magpie [30] where the application is not available to us), and its 
algorithms are not dependent on a huge set of parameters whose settings are left mysterious in the 
publication (compare to the machine learning approach in [22][23] where several statistical 
distributions would have to be assumed). 
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We implement the Pinpoint algorithm (as explained in [29]) for comparison with our Monitor’s 
diagnosis approach. Pinpoint diagnosis algorithm requires as input a dependency table—a mapping 
of which components each transaction depends on. This is in contrast to the Monitor approach, 
where such dependency information does not have to be determined a priori and fed into the system 
before execution. Instead the Monitor deduces the dependencies through runtime observations as 
described in Section II.B. For Pinpoint, when transactions are executed, their failure status is 
determined by the failure detectors. A table (called the input matrix) is then created with the rows 
being the transactions, the first column being the failure status, and the other columns being the 
different components. If a cell T(i, 1) is 1, it indicates transaction i has failed. If a cell T(i, j) (j≠1) is 
1, it indicates transaction i uses the component j. Pinpoint correlates the failures of transactions to 
the components that are most likely to be the cause of the failure. The input matrix is fed as input to 
a data clustering engine. The transpose of this binary input matrix is used by the data analysis 
engine. The data analyzer computes the dissimilarity between the rows of transposed matrix, which 
is represented by Jaccard`s distance. This matrix containing the distances between the components 
is fed to a clustering algorithm called the Unweighted Pair Group Method with Arithmetic Mean 
(UPGMA). The components that fall in the cluster having the failure row are diagnosed to be faulty. 
A crucial point for the accurate operation of Pinpoint is that the transactions should be diverse 
enough, i.e., use distinct non-overlapping components. Two transactions T1 and T2 are called 
distinct with respect to a set of components {C1, C2, …, Ck} if there is no overlap between these 
columns for T1 and T2, i.e., when T1’s row has a 1 in any of these columns, T2’s row has a zero, and 
vice-versa. Pinpoint as described by the authors in [29] is an offline approach. For comparison with 
the Monitor, we convert it into an online protocol. We incrementally feed the transactions and their 
corresponding failure status as they occur in the application, rather than waiting for all the 
transactions in a round to be completed before executing Pinpoint. To provide a comparable 
platform between the Monitor and Pinpoint, we keep the testbed identical to that in [29]—same 
client, web server, application server (with identical components), and database server. Since the 
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performance of the Monitor and Pinpoint are sensitive to the transactions used, we would have liked 
to use the same set of transactions as used by Pinpoint in [29]. However, the paper is silent on the 
issue—it does not even provide the total number of transactions used. We contacted the authors of 
Pinpoint but they were unable to provide us with the transactions either (see personal 
communication in [42]).  
D. Detectors 
We create the same detectors as in [29].  An internal and an external failure detector are built which 
provide failure status of transactions to Pinpoint and the Monitor. The external detector detects 
failures that will be visible to the user, such as application-specific failures, machine crashes or 
complete service failures. We implemented this external detector as part of the client emulator. It 
examines the output error log of lynx and flags a failure if an HTTP error is observed. Alternately, 
if a transaction does not complete within 20 seconds, timeout occurs and the detector flags a failure.  
An internal detector is used to detect a failure that may not imme diately manifest itself to users. 
The internal detector is built to catch Java declared and undeclared exceptions in the application and 
is embedded in each component.  
E. Fault Injection 
 
We perform fault injection into the components of the PetStore application (i.e., Servlets and EJBs). 
We choose a set of 9 components called target components consisting of six EJBs and three servlets 
for fault injection. The names of the components are AddressEJB, AsyncSenderEJB, CatalogEJB, 
CreditCardEJB, ContactInfoEJB, SupplierClientLocalFacadeEJB, enter_order_information.screen, 
order.do, and item.screen. We use four different kinds of fault injection as in [29]:  
− Declared Exception: We inject IOException as the representative declared exception.  
− Undeclared Exception: This is a Runtime Exception not caught in the application.  
− Endless call: The target component has an infinite while loop.  
− Null call: Instead of returning the appropriate value, a method returns a null object.  
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The internal detector is more likely to detect the declared and the undeclared exceptions, and the 
null calls while the external detector is more likely to detect the endless call. For a given round only 
one target component is injected. We use 1-component, 2-component and 3-component triggers. In 
a 1-component trigger, every time the target component is touched by a transaction, the fault in 
injected in that component. In a 2-component trigger, a sequence of 2-components is determined 
and whenever the sequence is touched during a transaction, the last component in the transaction is 
injected. This mimics an interaction fault between two components, and, in the correct operation of 
a diagnosis protocol, both components should be flagged as faulty. The 3-component fault is 
defined similarly.   
V. Results 
A. Performance Metrics 
 
We use precision and accuracy as output metrics as in the Pinpoint work to enable a comparison. A 
result is accurate when all components causing a fault are correctly identified. For example, if two 
components, A and B, are interacting to cause a failure, identifying both would be accurate. 
Identifying only one or neither would not be accurate. However, if the predicted fault set (by the 
diagnosis algorithm) is {A, B, C, D, E} and the fault was in components {A, B}, then the accuracy 
is still 100%. Precision captures the non-idealness in this case. Precision is the ratio of the number 
of faulty components to the total number of entities in the predicted fault set. In the above example, 
the precision is 40%. Components {C, D, E} are false positives. Lower precision implies high false 
positives. There is a tension between accuracy and precision in most diagnosis algorithms. When 
the algorithm is sensitive, it generates highly accurate results, but also causes a large number of 
false alerts reducing precision. Pinpoint uses the UPGMA clustering algorithm and varying the size 
of the faulty cluster varies the precision and accuracy. In the Monitor, after the diagnosis algorithm 
terminates, an ordered list of components is produced in decreasing order of PPEP. We define the 
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predicted fault set as the top k components in the ordered output list. We vary k to obtain different 
accuracy and precision values.  
B. Single Component Faults 
In single component faults, the fault injection trigger consists of a single component. If a transaction 
touches the target component then one of the four kinds of faults (chosen randomly) is injected and 
the injection remains permanent for the remainder of the round. First, let us consider the effect of 
varying cluster size on the performance of Pinpoint. The total number of injections for these results 
is 36—9 target components for injection and all 4 types of injection done on each component. The 
averaged results for accuracy and precision are plotted in Figure 7 (the bars show 90% confidence 
interval). As the size of the cluster increases, we see an increase in the accuracy which is intuitive 
because at some point the failure cluster includes all the components that are actually faulty. 
Beyond that, increase in cluster size does not impact the accuracy. As the cluster size increases, the 
precision increases to a maximum value and then decreases thereafter. The increase occurs till all 
the faulty components are included in the failure cluster. Thereafter, increasing the cluster size 
includes other non-faulty components and thus brings down the precision. The maximum value of 
precision occurs when all the faulty components are included in the failure cluster. However the 
precision is still poor (less than 10%). This is explained by the observation that for the transactions 
in the application, there is tight coupling between multiple components. Whenever the entire set of 
tightly coupled components does not appear together as a fault trigger, which is the overwhelming 
majority of the injections, the precision suffers. The amount of tight coupling between the 
components is quantified through the experiment in Section F. We emphasize that if we were to 
hand pick transactions such that they are distinguishable with respect to the target components, then 
the performance of Pinpoint would improve. Two transactions Ti and Tj are indistinguishable with 
respect to a set of components {C1, C2, … , Ck} if the columns of Ti in the input matrix 
corresponding to these components are identical to that of Tj. Figure 7(a) shows the variation of 
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Accuracy with False Positives for Pinpoint and the Monitor. This is averaged across the 36 
injections for the presented results. For 1-component faults, Pinpoint has high false positives rates 
but the accuracy eventually reaches 1. In contrast the Monitor has a much higher accuracy keeping 
a low false positive rate. Monitor’s accuracy also reaches 1 but at a much lower value of false 
positives (0.6) as compared to Pinpoint (> 0.9). The latency of detection in our system is very low. 
Thus, the faulty component is often at the root of the Diagnosis Tree in the Monitor. Since error 
propagation is thus minimized, the PPEP value for the faulty entity is high causing it to be 
diagnosed by the Monitor. This explains the high accuracy for the Monitor. However, Pinpoint’s 
algorithm does not take advantage of the temporal information—the temporal proximity between 
the component where detection occurs and the component that is faulty. As a consequence its 
accuracy suffers relative to that of the Monitor. 
Notice that in Pinpoint, for a given value of false positives, two different accuracy values are 
achieved since a given precision value is achieved for two different cluster sizes (Figure 7(b)). 
Since accuracy is a monotonically increasing plot with cluster size (Figure 7(a)), the different 






































































Figure 8. Single component fault injection: Performance of Pinpoint and Monitor. Both can 
achieve high accuracy but Pinpoint suffers from high false positive rates. 
C. Two Component Faults 
The 2-component fault injection results are shown in Figure 9. Pinpoint results improve in terms of 
the false positives implying higher precision. This is attributed to the fact that Pinpoint’s clustering 
method works better if the failing transactions are better distinguishable from the successful 
transactions. Recollect distinguishable is discussed in the context of components. A 2-component 
fault includes two components as the trigger and going from one component to two components 
increases the distinguish-ability of transactions. Consider transaction T1 and T2 both of which use 
component C1 (the trigger in a single component fault injection). However, for a two component 
fault injection with trigger as {C1, C2}, the transactions T1 and T2 will be distinguishable as long as 
both T1 and T2 do not use C2. Thus, say T1 uses {C1, C2} and T2 does not use C2. Then only T1 will 
fail and T2 will not, leading to the diagnosis (considering simplistically that these are the only 
transactions and components) of C1-C2 as the faulty entities.  
   In contrast, the Monitor results although, still significantly better than Pinpoint, suffer in the 2-
component fault injection. One can see that accuracy reaches a maximum of only 0.83 compared to 
1.00 in 1-component injection. The number of times in a round the trigger for the 2-component fault 
is hit is lower than for the single component fault. Each detection causes an execution of the 
diagnosis process and each execution of the diagnosis process updates the parameters of the causal 
graph away from an arbitrary initial setting toward an accurate set of values. Thus, for the 2-
component faults, the Monitor gets less opportunity for refining the parameter values and 
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consequently the PPEP calculation is not as accurate as for the single component faults. This 







































Figure 9. 2-component fault injection: Performance of Pinpoint and Monitor. Performance of 
Monitor declines and Pinpoint improves from the single component fault, but Monitor still 
outperforms Pinpoint. 
D. Three Component Faults 
The 3-component fault injections show even better results for Pinpoint with the maximum average 
precision value touching 27%. This is again attributed to the fact that more number of components 
causes selected transactions to fail leading to a better performance by the clustering algorithm. The 
Monitor again outperforms Pinpoint by achieving higher accuracy at much lower false positives. 
The Monitor’s performance again declines compared to the 2-component faults due to the same 
reason pointed in the previous section (the number of diagnoses for the 3-component trigger is less 






































Figure 10. 3-component fault injection: Performance of Pinpoint and Monitor. Performance 
of Monitor declines and Pinpoint improves from the single and two component fault, but 




In its online incarnation, Pinpoint takes as input the transactions and corresponding failure status 
every 30 seconds during a round. It runs the diagnosis for each of these snapshots taken at 30 
second intervals, terminating when the round is complete and Pinpoint executes on the entire input 
matrix corresponding to all the 55 transactions. Pinpoint’s performance only becomes reasonable at 
3.5 minutes and above and hence we report only this part of the plot. Arguably this is a subjective 
decision, but we find the meaningful insights are only possible when Pinpoint has data worth 3.5 
minutes or more. The latency plots show that after 3.5 minutes the accuracy and precision increase 
monotonically with latency. 
We define the latency of diagnosis for the Monitor as the time delay from the receipt of the detector 
alert which marks the beginning of the diagnosis till the PPEP ordered list is generated. The 
Monitor has an average latency of 58.32 ms with a variance of 14.35 ms, aggregated across all three 





































Figure 11. Single component fault injection: Variation of accuracy and precision with latency 
for Pinpoint. Higher latency means higher number of transaction data points and Pinpoint’s 
performance improves monotonically. 
 
F. Behavior of Components 
The PetStore application has some components which are tightly coupled, i.e., they tend to be 
invoked together for the different transactions supported by the application. We have noted earlier 
that tight coupling negatively impacts Pinpoint’s clustering algorithm. For our experiments, we 
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inject failures in 9 components and here we consider how tightly coupled these components are 
with the other components in PetStore. AddressEJB is tightly coupled with 4 components implying 
that it always occurs with these 4 components in all the 55 transactions in our experimental setup. 
Pinpoint cannot distinguish between sets of components that are tightly coupled and thus reports all 
the tightly coupled components as faulty even though in reality only a subset of these may be faulty. 
This is the fundamental reason why its precision is found to be low in all our experiments. To 
counter this problem, one can synthetically create transactions that independently use different 
components (as noted by the authors themselves in [29]). However, for an application like PetStore, 
components are naturally tightly coupled and thus generating such synthetic transactions is a 
difficult task. Also even if we could devise such “unnatural” transactions that would make 
components distinguishable, it cannot be assumed that such transactions will be created by regular 

































































































Figure 12. Tightly connected components 
 
VI. Related Work 
White box systems: The problem of diagnosis in distributed systems can be classified according to 
the nature of the application system being monitored – white box where the system is observable 
and, optionally, controllable; and black box where the system is neither. The Monitor system falls in 
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the latter class. White box diagnostic systems often use event correlation where every managed 
device is instrumented to emit an alarm when its state changes [8][18]-[20]. By correlating the 
received alarms, a centralized manager is able to diagnose the problem. Obviously, this depends on 
access to the internals of the application components. Also it raises the concern whether a failing 
component’s embedded detector can generate the alert. This model does not fit our problem 
description since the target system for the Monitor comprises of COTS components, which have to 
be treated as black-box. A number of white box diagnosis systems that correlate alarms have been 
proposed in the intrusion detection area [43][44]. An alternative diagnostic approach is to use end-
to-end probing [21]-[23]. A probe is a test transaction whose outcome depends on some of the 
system’s components; diagnosis is performed by appropriately selecting the probes and analyzing 
the results. Probe selection is typically an offline, inexact, and computationally heavy process. 
Probing is an intrusive mechanism because it stresses the system with new requests. Also it is not 
guaranteed that the state of the system with respect to the failure being diagnosed has stayed 
constant till the time of the probe. 
Multiprocessor system diagnosis: The traditional field of diagnosis has developed around the 
target of multiprocessor systems, first addressed in a seminal paper by Preparata et al. [11] known 
as the PMC method. The PMC approach, along with several other deterministic models [7], 
assumed tests to be perfect and mandated that each entity be tested a fixed number of times. 
Probabilistic diagnosis, on the other hand, can only diagnose faulty nodes with a high probability 
but can relax assumptions about the nature of the fault (intermittent faulty nodes can be diagnosed) 
and the structure of the testing graph [14], [15]. Follow up work focused on multiple syndrome 
testing [13] where multiple syndromes were generated for the same node proceeding in multiple 
lock steps. Both use the comparison based testing approach whereby a test workload is executed by 
multiple nodes and a difference indicates suspicion of failure. The authors in [24] propose a fully 
distributed algorithm that allows every fault-free node to achieve diagnosis in, at most, (log N)2 
testing rounds. More recently, in [25] the authors extend traditional multiprocessor diagnosis to 
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handle change of failure state during the diagnostic process. All of these approaches are 
fundamentally different from ours since there is no separation between the payload and the monitor 
system. This implies the application system has to be observable as well as controllable (to generate 
the tests and analyze them).  
Embedded system diagnosis: There has also been considerable work in the area of diagnosis of 
embedded systems, particularly in automotive electronic systems as in [26] (detection and shut 
down of faulty actuators in automotive systems) and [27] (use assertions to correlate anomalies 
from multiple components). The papers in this domain do not consider imperfect observability of 
the sensor input or the actuator output, possibly because of tight coupling between the payload and 
the monitor systems. They are focused on scheduling monitor processes under tight computational 
resource constraints while we do not have such constraints. 
Debugging in distributed applications: There has been a spurt of work in providing tools for 
debugging problems in distributed applications – performance problems [28]-[30], 
misconfigurations [31], unexpected behavior [31], etc. The general flavor of the approaches in this 
domain is that the tool collects trace information at different levels of granularity (line of code to 
process) and the collected traces are automatically analyzed, often offline, to determine the possible 
root causes of the problem. For example, in [28], the debugging system performs analysis of 
message traces to determine the causes of long latencies. The goal of these efforts is to deduce 
dependencies in distributed applications and flag possible root causes to aid the programmer in the 
manual debug process, and not to produce automated diagnosis. Moreover tools like Pip [45],  
debug distributed applications by comparing the actual behaviour to the expected behaviour of an 
application. They give an expectation language that allows the programmer to express in a 
declarative language the expections about the system.  Also they provide tools for gathering events, 
checking behavior and visualizing valid and invalid behaviors which aid in tracking the bugs. 
  More recent work has produced powerful tools for debugging of distributed applications. In [45], 
the authors present a tool called liblog that aids in recreating the events that occurred prior to and 
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during failure. The replay can be done offline at a different site. The tool guarantees that the event 
state in its log will be consistent, i.e., no message is received before it has been sent. This work 
stops short of automated diagnosis. Some other mechanism, not described in the paper, is 
responsible for taking the replayed events and determining the root cause. There are several other 
offline tools that aid diagnosis, such as tools for data slicing [46], backtracking [47], and 
deterministic replay [48][49], but they all require manual effort in diagnosing the faulty components. 
  Online tools focus on data collection [48][50][51] rather than on automated diagnosis. A recent 
work [52] performs online failure diagnosis through a novel concept. When a failure occurs, some 
failure triggering events are captured right then. The system can roll back to a checkpoint in case of 
failure and when re-executing, heavy duty instrumentation is applied. Inspired by manual 
debugging, the Triage Diagnosis Protocol (TDP) provides a top-down failure-guided diagnosis. 
Based on the failure symptom and previous diagnosis results, TDP automatically decides the next 
step of instrumentation or analysis.  The initial diagnosis happens at the user site, preserving the 
privacy of any user data, and then the detailed diagnosis happens at the programmer's site. This 
work relies on perfect checkpointing and the assumption that the state will not change between the 
original failing execution and the re-execution. It also assumes the application is white-box and can 
be instrumented. The work has to deal with the challenge of the user not trusting the debugging 
system completely. This problem is assumed away in our workthe Monitor can observe any 
interaction between the application components. 
Network diagnosis: Diagnosis in IP networks is adderessed in Shrink [54]. This tool used for root 
cause analysis of network faults models the diagnosis problem as a Bayesian network. It 
specifically diagnoses inaccurate mappings between IP and optical layers. The work in [55] studies 
the effectiveness and practicality of Tree-Augmented Naive Bayesian Networks (or TANs) as a 
basis for performing offline diagnosis and forecasting from system-level instrumentation in a three-
tier network service.  The TAN models are studied to select combinations of metrics and thresholds 
values that correlate with performance states of the systems (compliance with Service Level 
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Objectves).  This approach differs from the Monitor approach in the sense that it relies on 
monitoring performance metrics rather than diagnosing the origin of the problem over a set of 
possible components.  
Automated diagnosis in COTS systems: Automated diagnosis for black-box distributed COTS 
components is addressed in [32], [33]. The system model has replicated COTS application 
components, whose outputs are voted on and the replicas which differ from the majority are 
considered suspect. This work takes the restricted view that all application components are 
replicated and failures manifest as divergences from the majority. In [17], the authors present a 
combined model for automated detection, diagnosis, and recovery with the goal of automating the 
recovery process. However, the failures are all fail-silent and no error propagation happens in the 
system, the results of any test can be instantaneously observed, and the monitor accuracy is 
predictable.  
  In none of the existing work that we are aware of is there a rigorous treatment of the impact of the 
Monitor’s constraints and limited observability on the accuracy of the diagnosis process. There are 
sometimes statements made on this without supporting reasoning – for example, in [28], it is 
mentioned that drop rates up to 5% do not affect accuracy of the diagnosis.  
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper we presented an online diagnosis system called the Monitor for arbitrary failures in 
distributed applications. The Monitor passively observes the message exchanges between the 
components of the application and at runtime, performs a probabilistic diagnosis of the component 
that was the root cause of a detected failure The Monitor is compared to the state-of –the-art 
diagnosis framework called Pinpoint.  
We tested the two systems on a 3-tier Java-based e-commerce system called PetStore. Extensive 
fault injection experiments were performed to evaluate the accuracy and precision of the two 
schemes. The Monitor outperformed Pinpoint particularly in precision, though its advantage 
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narrowed for interaction faults. As part of future work we are looking at diagnosis in high 
throughput network streams.  In these streams, the Monitor may have to decide to drop some parts 
of a stream. We are looking into intelligent decision making to maintain a high accuracy. We are 
also investigating machine learning based diagnosis in the presence of uncertain information. 
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